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INTRODUCTION
The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM’s) 1999 report, To Err is Human,
launched the modern patient-safety movement.1 Rereading it nearly
twenty years later, one is struck by two pervasive tones: alarm and
optimism.
There was plenty to be alarmed about. Summarizing available evi-
dence on the incidence of medical injury, the report estimated that
preventable adverse events in U.S. hospitals caused between 44,000
and 98,000 deaths annually at a cost of $17–$29 billion.2 Because the
scale of the public health problem was not widely known, these statis-
tics had shock value.3 Medical error had suddenly surpassed motor
vehicle accidents to become the most prevalent type of serious injury
and now ranked near diabetes mellitus and Alzheimer’s disease as a
leading cause of death.
In spite of the daunting magnitude of the problem, the report is
infused with a sense that major gains were within reach. The critical
move was for health care delivery systems to emulate strategies devel-
oped and implemented successfully by other high-risk industries—
manufacturing, nuclear energy, and aviation. That theme underpins
most of the IOM report’s major recommendations: improved report-
ing and surveillance of risks and events; culture change within health
care organizations, including a “no-blame” climate to promote report-
ing of adverse events; enhanced oversight by payors as well as licens-
ing and accreditation bodies; prioritization of safety at the highest
levels of institutional leadership; adoption of error-reduction technol-
ogies and interventions with proven efficacy; and investment in
research.
What role did the IOM report envision for law and lawyers? To the
limited extent that they are mentioned at all, the message is clear: Get
out of the way. Safety was “hindered through the liability system and
1. See generally INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
2. Id. at 1–2.
3. The IOM report’s upper bound on the empirical estimates was derived from a study of
adverse events in New York hospitals published nearly a decade earlier. See Troyen A. Brennan
et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the
Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991) [hereinafter Brennan et al.,
Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients]; Lucian L. Leape et al., The
Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study
II, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991). The estimate’s lower bound came from a similar study
conducted in Colorado and Utah that was completed and under peer review at the time the IOM
report was being written. See Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and
Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261 (2000) [hereinafter Thomas et al.,
Incidence and Types of Adverse Events].
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the threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors.”4
Discoverability and admissibility of information in legal proceedings
“encourages silence about errors committed or observed.”5 Risk man-
agement within hospitals was an enterprise focused on “loss control,”
not safety or quality improvement.6 Further, the report’s recommen-
dations for enhanced oversight looked mainly to professional bodies,
rather than government regulators or courts.7 In sum, law was not the
solution or even part of the solution; it was part of the problem.
Did the IOM report put law in its proper place? In this Article, we
argue that it did not, and that the patient-safety movement’s posture
from the outset—indifference at best, and occasionally open disdain—
has had enduring consequences. Although there are real tensions be-
tween the core objectives and approaches of quality improvement and
the legal system, leaders of the movement have been so transfixed by
these tensions that they have failed to recognize the necessity and po-
tential usefulness of legal institutions to the enterprise.
Part I briefly reviews the movement’s progress. Part II questions
some of the received wisdom about the corrosive impact of legal
forces. Part III describes the divide that opened up between the
patient-safety movement and certain legal institutions (chiefly, the
tort system and practitioner boards) that are devoted to the pursuit of
individual accountability. Parts III and IV discuss several contribu-
tions to making care safer these institutions have nevertheless made
and others they could make.
I. PROGRESS IN THE WAR ON MEDICAL ERROR
Fresh consideration of roles for legal institutions is important be-
cause of the need to reinvigorate medical error reduction efforts. Al-
though the past two decades have seen some notable achievements,
progress overall has not met expectations. With easy wins now mostly
exhausted, the pace and magnitude of further improvements are likely
to diminish.
4. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
5. One of the only positive statements the Report makes is that, “Liability is part of the sys-
tem of accountability and serves a legitimate role in holding people responsible for their ac-
tions.” Id. at 110.
6. Id. at 270.
7. Id. at 132–54.
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A. Advances
A period of frenetic activity followed release of the IOM report.
Congressional inquiries were convened and legislation was passed.8
Federal agencies and influential expert bodies set ambitious patient-
safety goals, as accreditors moved quickly to adopt patient-safety stan-
dards.9 The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality pivoted to-
ward more research on medical error, pushing patient safety from a
peripheral area of health services research to the field’s core. Adverse
event reporting systems were established in states and hospitals across
the country.10 Health care delivery organizations hired patient-safety
officers and launched countless initiatives aimed at improving safety.
Did this wave of activity make a difference? Examples of progress
are readily identifiable.11 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) and most states now require adverse events involving
harm to be reported to regulators, adding to voluntary reporting ini-
tiatives that have made health care quality and safety data more avail-
able to the public.12 Accreditation standards now routinely include
8. See, e.g., Medical Error Reduction Act of 2000, S. 2038, 106th Cong. (2000); Stop All Fre-
quent Errors (SAFE) in Medicare and Medicaid Act of 2000, S. 2378, 106th Cong. (2000); Medi-
cation Error Prevention Act of 2000, H.R. 3672, 106th Cong. (2000); Patient Safety and Errors
Reduction Act, S. 2738, 106th Cong. (2000); Voluntary Error Reduction and Improvement in
Patient Safety Act, S. 2743, 106th Cong. (2000).
9. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The Leapfrog Standards: Ready to Jump from Marketplace to
Courtroom?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 46, 46–47 (2003) (discussing a range of goals and initiatives that
emerged in several years after the IOM report); see also INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at ix–x (2001) [hereinafter IOM,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM] (following up on the initial IOM Report, supra note 1, and
recommending additional steps to improve quality of care and patient safety); Special Edition:
JCAHO Patient Safety Goals 2003, TOPICS IN PATIENT SAFETY (VA Nat’l Ctr. for Patient
Safety), Dec. 2002; Milt Freudenheim, Big Companies Lead Effort to Reduce Medical Errors,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/16/business/big-companies-lead-
effort-to-reduce-medical-errors.html; Safe Practices for Better Healthcare, NAT’L QUALITY F.,
http://www.qualityforum.org/news_and_resources/press_kits/safe_practices_for_better_health
care.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
10. CARRIE HANLON ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, 2014 GUIDE TO
STATE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEMS 2 (2015), https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/2014_Guide_to_State_Adverse_Event_Reporting_Systems.pdf.
11. Useful summaries are available in Allen Kachalia et al., Legal and Policy Interventions to
Improve Patient Safety, 133 CIRCULATION 661 (2016) [hereinafter Kachalia et al., Legal and Pol-
icy Interventions to Improve Patient Safety]; Robert M. Wachter, Patient Safety at Ten: Unmistak-
able Progress, Troubling Gaps, 29 HEALTH AFF. 165 (2010); and National Scorecard on Rates of
Hospital-Acquired Conditions 2010 to 2015: Interim Data from National Efforts to Make Health
Care Safer, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (Dec. 2016), http://www.ahrq.gov/pro
fessionals/quality-patient-safety/pfp/2015-interim.html.
12. Kachalia et al., Legal and Policy Interventions to Improve Patient Safety, supra note 11, at R
661–64.
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patient-safety indicators.13 Further, there have been several salutary
moves from payors. Medicare, for example, has deemed a select group
of complications of in-hospital care unacceptable and will no longer
pay for associated care.14 More broadly, CMS and other payors have
broadened use of performance-based payment incentives that are
linked to measures of quality and safety,15 though it is unclear
whether this trend will continue in light of mounting evidence that
payment incentives (at least as currently structured) do not stimulate
large improvements in quality.16
There are promising signs of culture change, including a clearer un-
derstanding among providers that unanticipated outcomes of care
should be disclosed to patients and their families, reported to hospitals
and regulatory bodies, and investigated.17 In conducting those investi-
gations and acting on findings, there is also keener commitment to
considering upstream links in the causal chain, not merely the hapless
provider at its end. Evidence that improvements in safety culture
translate into reduced error rates exists, though it is quite weak.18
Most importantly, a handful of highly promising interventions to
improve safety have been identified and widely adopted.19 The two
most celebrated are an aviation-style checklist and team training inter-
vention designed to prevent bloodstream infections in intensive care
13. See, e.g., “Patient Safety Systems” (PS) Chapter, JOINT COMMISSION (Dec. 18, 2017), https:/
/www.jointcommission.org/patient_safety_systems_chapter_for_the_hospital_program/.
14. Arnold Milstein, Ending Extra Payment for “Never Events”—Stronger Incentives for Pa-
tients’ Safety, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2388, 2388 (2009).
15. Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals—HHS Efforts to Improve U.S.
Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897, 897 (2015); Kachalia et al., Legal and Policy Interven-
tions to Improve Patient Safety, supra note 11, at 664. R
16. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The Role of Transparency in Patient Safety Improvement, in
TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE (Holly F. Lynch et al. eds., forthcoming 2019)
(citing Aaron Mendelson et al., The Effects of Pay-for-Performance Programs on Health, Health
Care Use, and Processes of Care: A Systematic Review, 166 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 341, 348–50
(2017)).
17. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 356 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2713, 2713 (2007) [hereinafter Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to
Patients].
18. See generally Sallie J. Weaver et al., Promoting a Culture of Safety as a Patient Safety
Strategy: A Systematic Review, 158 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 369 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Alex B. Haynes et al., A Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and Mor-
tality in a Global Population, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491 (2009); Julia Neily et al., Association
Between Implementation of a Medical Team Training Program and Surgical Mortality, 304
JAMA 1693 (2010); Teryl K. Nuckols et al., The Effectiveness of Computerized Order Entry at
Reducing Preventable Adverse Drug Events and Medication Errors in Hospital Settings: A Sys-
tematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 3 SYSTEMATIC REVS. 56 (2014); Peter Pronovost et al., An
Intervention to Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections in the ICU, 355 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2725 (2006).
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units,20 and the World Health Organization’s surgical safety check-
list.21 In addition, most types of hospital-acquired infections, a sus-
tained target of quality improvement efforts, have declined markedly
over the last decade.22
Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus that overall progress has
been frustratingly slow. The absence of any comprehensive longitudi-
nal studies of adverse event rates makes it difficult to say how slow,
but the available evidence suggests that overall rates of medical injury
have either not declined or, at best, receded slightly and unevenly.23
The report’s goal of a 50% reduction in error by 2005 almost certainly
remains unmet in 2018. Indeed, it is questionable whether a typical
patient receiving care from a typical health professional in a typical
U.S. hospital or clinic today is at appreciably lower risk of experienc-
ing a preventable medical injury than she was twenty years ago.
B. Stumbling Blocks
Why have improvement efforts fallen short? A number of expert
commentaries have addressed this question and draw some consistent
conclusions.24 First, inevitably, the initial surge of enthusiasm waned,
and patient safety eventually took its place in the host of pressing
problems that compete for attention in health care delivery systems.
Second, the goalposts shifted into the distance. More recent studies
20. Pronovost et al., supra note 19. R
21. Haynes et al., supra note 19. R
22. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL AND STATE HEALTHCARE AS-
SOCIATION INFECTIONS: PROGRESS REPORT 5–6 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/HAI/pdfs/progress-
report/hai-progress-report.pdf.
23. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., OEI-06-09-00090, ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, at i (2010) (estimating that 1 in 7 Medicare beneficiaries discharged
from hospitals in October 2008 experienced an adverse event during their stay); Rebecca J.
Baines et al., Changes in Adverse Event Rates in Hospitals over Time: A Longitudinal Retrospec-
tive Patient Record Review Study, 22 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 290, 292–93 (2013) (showing
adverse event rates among hospitalized patients in the Netherlands increased from 4.1% in 2004
to 6.2% in 2008 and rates of preventable adverse did not change); Christopher P. Landrigan et
al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2124, 2127–30 (2010) (showing no significant reductions in rates in adverse events or pre-
ventable adverse events in 10 hospitals that were actively pursuing improvements in patient
safety); Yun Wang et al., National Trends in Patient Safety for Four Common Conditions,
2005–2011, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 341, 344 (2014) (finding declines in adverse event rates from
2005 to 2011 among patients hospitalized for myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure,
but not among those hospitalized with pneumonia and conditions requiring surgery).
24. See, e.g., Kaveh G. Shojania & Eric J. Thomas, Trends in Adverse Events over Time: Why
Are We Not Improving?, 22 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 273 (2013); Wachter, supra note 11; see R
also Mark R. Chassin, Improving the Quality of Health Care: What’s Taking So Long?, 32
HEALTH AFF. 1761 (2013).
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suggest that the true rate of medical injury exceeds the report’s origi-
nal estimates,25 increasing the size of what was already an enormous
challenge.
Third, and most importantly, after the patient-safety movement’s
early efforts successfully harvested some low-hanging fruit,26 it be-
came apparent that the etiology of medical error was much more com-
plex than anticipated.27 Health care delivery systems are more
heterogeneous, fragmented, and multifaceted than other industries
(e.g., airline, manufacturing) whose safety improvement strategies the
report urged emulation. Consequently, the type of cross-cutting inter-
ventions that proved so successful in those industries did not translate
neatly to health care. Rather, safety-improvement work in health care
involves many specialty-, treatment-, and outcome-specific initiatives.
It is, in large part, a thousand skirmishes, not the broad frontal assault
that some movement leaders had envisioned.
Fourth, it became apparent almost immediately that the science of
patient safety was overmatched.28 The influx of adverse event report-
ing systems produced an explosion of information, but little of it was
used to generate useful knowledge or guide action. Reporting was se-
lective, crucial information on causal factors and patient outcomes
was missing, and standardized definitions and frameworks for catego-
rization and analysis were slow to emerge. Despite some noteworthy
25. MATT AUSTIN & JORDAN DERK, LIVES LOST, LIVES SAVED: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF AVOIDABLE DEATHS AT HOSPITALS GRADED BY THE LEAPFROG GROUP (2016); David Clas-
sen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows That Adverse Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times
Greater Than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 581 (2011); John T. James, A New, Evi-
dence-Based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAFETY
122 (2013); Landrigan et al., supra note 23; Martin A. Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical Er- R
ror—The Third Leading Cause of Death in the US, 353 BMJ i2139 (2016). But see Kaveh
Shojania & Mary Dixon-Woods, Estimating Deaths Due to Medical Error: The Ongoing Contro-
versy and Why It Matters, 26 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 423 (2017) (arguing that recent studies
estimating higher rates of mortality due to medical error have substantial methodological flaws).
26. Examples of early wins include simple steps to reduce central-line-associated bloodstream
infections, insert chest tubes more safely, avoid chemotherapy overdoses, and avoid accidental
injection of highly concentrated solutions of potassium chloride. See Lucian L. Leape et al.,
Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing Medical Error, 280 JAMA 1444, 1444 (1998); 10 Patient
Safety Tips for Hospitals, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (Dec. 2009), https://
www.ahrq.gov/patients-consumers/diagnosis-treatment/hospitals-clinics/10-tips/index.html (last
updated June 2018).
27. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., IMPROVING DIAGNOSIS IN HEALTH CARE 1 (Erin
P. Balogh et al. eds., 2015).
28. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Accidental Deaths, Saved Lives, and Improved Quality, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1405 (2005); Paul G. Shekelle et al., Advancing the Science of Patient Safety, 154
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 693 (2011).
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strides,29 fundamental measurement challenges remain. As Kaveh
Shojania and Eric Thomas have noted, one troubling consequence of
this is that even if substantial improvement had occurred, it is still not
clear we would know it.30
Fifth, the bleak reality is that all of the effort and investment to date
has produced disappointingly few interventions with proven efficacy
in reducing errors. A number of the most widely adopted interven-
tions—including computerized physician order entry and decision
support, rapid response teams, medication reconciliation, time limits
on trainee shifts, and efforts to improve safety culture—have demon-
strated some success, but there are reasons to be cautious. Very few of
the evaluations are rigorous enough to demonstrate causal associa-
tions, and successes in one place have often proved difficult to repli-
cate in others.31
Indeed, it is increasingly clear that the effectiveness of prevention
measures is highly context-dependent. This is the sixth factor underly-
ing our slow progress on patient safety. Even technological interven-
tions, like computerized order entry, and rigorously evaluated ones,
like the surgical checklist, appear to be highly sensitive to the manner
in which they are implemented and the environment into which they
are placed.32 This context dependency raises fundamental questions
about how useful conventional evaluation markers like average effects
are in understanding the utility of interventions.
Seventh, as the patient-safety movement matured, disagreements
emerged among its leaders about directions and priorities. One point
of divergence related to what constituted sufficient proof of an inter-
29. See, e.g., World Health Organization, More Than Words: Conceptual Framework for the
International Classification for Patient Safety, WHO/IER/PSP/2010.2 (2010), http://www.who.int/
patientsafety/implementation/taxonomy/ICPS-report/en/.
30. Shojania & Thomas, supra note 24, at 274–75. R
31. See, e.g., id.; Elzerie de Jager et al., Postoperative Adverse Events Inconsistently Improved
by the World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist: A Systematic Literature Review of 25
Studies, 40 WORLD J. SURGERY 1842, 1843 (2016); Asad Latif et al., Evaluating Safety Initiatives
in Healthcare, 4 CURRENT ANESTHESIOLOGY REP. 100, 100–01 (2014); Nuckols et al., supra note
19.
32. Checklists have emerged as a study in the importance of attending to institutional context
and mode of implementation. See, e.g., PETER PRONOVOST & ERIC VOHR, SAFE PATIENTS,
SMART HOSPITALS: HOW ONE DOCTOR’S CHECKLIST CAN HELP US CHANGE HEALTH CARE
FROM THE INSIDE OUT (2010); Charles L. Bosk et al., Reality Check for Checklists, 374 LANCET
444, 445 (2009); Daniel E. Ho et al., Do Checklists Make a Difference? A Natural Experiment
from Food Safety Enforcement, 15 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 242, 245–48 (2018) (reviewing evidence
of the efficacy of checklists in health care and noting that their implementation is typically ac-
companied by a host of other institutional changes that may confound the “treatment effect” of
the checklist itself); David R. Urbach et al., Introduction of Surgical Safety Checklists in Ontario,
Canada, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1029, 1030 (2014).
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vention’s efficacy to justify rollout. While some urged action even
when limited evidence was available to support it, others urged cau-
tion until the efficacy of proposed interventions could be properly as-
sessed.33 Another divide pitted “lumpers” against “splitters.” Whereas
lumpers sought to focus effort and resources on high-level interven-
tions, like team training or cultural improvements, with potential to
drive reductions in many different forms of error, splitters saw tai-
lored solutions to specific clinical problems as the most promising
path forward. There is not an intrinsic conflict between these contrast-
ing approaches; they can operate as effective complements.34 But in
setting priorities, these have sometimes manifested as competing
worldviews.
Finally, we believe the patient-safety movement’s extreme emphasis
on systemic causes of error and shunning of individual accountability
has contributed to its slow pace of achievement. This move, estab-
lished as a core philosophy of the IOM report and espoused by pa-
tient-safety leaders ever since, was well intentioned. A shift away from
the historical, near-exclusive focus on individuals’ errors was also nec-
essary and appropriate. And indubitably, the fresh, hard look at sys-
tems has led to good things, such as an improved climate for
transparency about error. With the benefit of hindsight, however, we
believe the pendulum swung too far away from individual accountabil-
ity and toward systems-think. This impeded progress in some respects,
not least by marginalizing an important group of potentially valuable
partners: legal institutions.
II. THE PRODUCTION OF MEDICAL ERROR
A. The Primacy of System Factors
The IOM report, and the patient-safety movement that followed in
its wake, roundly rejected the notion that legal accountability has a
constructive role to play in addressing patient-safety objectives. The
rejection was premised on two main claims. One claim is utilitarian, or
pragmatic, in nature: Tackling individual failings is counterproductive
33. Andrew D. Auerbach et al., The Tension Between Needing to Improve Care and Knowing
How to Do It, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 608, 608 (2007); Lucian L. Leape et al., What Practices Will
Most Improve Safety? Evidence-Based Medicine Meets Patient Safety, 288 JAMA 501, 501 (2002);
Kaveh G. Shojania et al., Safe but Sound: Patient Safety Meets Evidence-Based Medicine, 288
JAMA 508, 508 (2002); Robert W. Wachter & Peter J. Pronovost, The 100,000 Lives Campaign:
A Scientific and Policy Review, 32 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 621
(2006).
34. Shojania & Thomas, supra note 24, at 274, make the interesting point that the “central line
bundle,” one of the most successful patient-safety intervention to date, included elements of
both schools.
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because it causes too much collateral damage to safety-improvement
efforts overall. The other is scientific: To interpret error as the product
of individual failings is to misunderstand its etiology. We review and
evaluate both claims.
1. Pragmatism
The thrust of the pragmatic claim is that a focus on individual fail-
ings undermines efforts to improve patient safety because it has corro-
sive effects on transparency about error.35 Blaming individuals stifles
adverse event reporting and frustrates investigations into what went
wrong and why. Blame also thwarts prevention by submerging infor-
mation needed to design effective error-reduction measures and foul-
ing the provider trust and buy-in on which successful implementation
of such measures depends. The stock-in-trade of tort litigation and
disciplinary systems is ferreting out and punishing individual failings.
The IOM committee concluded that, although those mechanisms
might redress individual instances of harm, they set the long game of
safety improvement back.
The only legal intervention the report firmly recommended was to
implement stronger rules to protect clinicians’ statements regarding
adverse events from use in legal proceedings. This was the reverse of
an accountability move; it was a way for the legal system to curb its
own destructive reach. Another way to mitigate the law’s deleterious
effects would be to abandon individually focused, fault-based liability
altogether, replacing it with enterprise liability, no-fault compensation
systems, or both. The report stopped short of recommending those
models, but urged further consideration of them, noting that they
“might produce a legal environment more conducive to reporting and
analysis.”36
In 2001, the IOM published a second report, Crossing the Quality
Chasm, which provided a more detailed roadmap for surmounting
barriers to quality and safety improvement.37 It took up the cudgel:
Law, again, was placed among the barriers to be surmounted, not
among the surmounting strategies. After echoing the first report’s
concerns about the nocuous effect of the specter of liability on trans-
35. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (“Providers also perceive the medical liability system as a
serious impediment to systematic efforts to uncover and learn from errors.”); id. at 22 (“Liability
concerns discourage the surfacing of errors and communication about how to correct them.”); id.
at 43 (claiming that the threat of malpractice litigation “discourages the disclosure of errors” and
that “[t]he discoverability of data under legal proceedings encourages silence about errors com-
mitted or observed[ ]”).
36. Id. at 111.
37. See generally IOM, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 9. R
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parency, the second report discussed chilling effects on innovation,
technology adoption, and evidence-based care.38 In addition, there
was another nod to enterprise liability and no-fault compensation as
alternatives that promised to be more hospitable to the work of qual-
ity improvement.39
2. The Science of Medical Error
The claim that aggressive pursuit of individual accountability for er-
rors in health care settings subverts safety-improvement activities has
intuitive appeal and a considerable body of anecdotal evidence sup-
porting it, although rigorous empirical evidence for the proposition is
surprisingly hard to come by. But if it could be shown that holding
clinicians individually accountable for some types of medical error did
not lead them to suppress information or dampen their enthusiasm for
patient-safety initiatives, would it be appropriate to do so?
The answer to this question in both IOM reports is a resounding
“no.” The reports’ authors justified that position through several sci-
entific claims regarding the etiology of medical error. These claims
warrant close analysis because they remain influential today; they
have become a leitmotif of the patient-safety movement, and have
been instrumental in setting the tone of the movement’s relationship
with legal institutions.
Drawing on accident research in other industries,40 To Err Is
Human explained that targeting individual behavior in efforts to ad-
dress medical error is misguided because it rests on a misunderstand-
ing of the role of human agency in the production of medical error:
One of the greatest contributors to accidents in any industry includ-
ing health care, is human error. However, saying that an accident is
due to human error is not the same as assigning blame because most
human errors are induced by system failures. Humans commit er-
rors for a variety of known and complicated reasons.41
In this account, errors arise from interactions between layers of causal
factors, some of which relate to the decisions and actions of individu-
als and some of which transcend individuals. System factors encom-
38. See, e.g., id. at 79, 218–19 (discussing various negative effects of the legal system).
39. Id. at 20. Crossing the Quality Chasm went further than To Err is Human had here. It
recommended that the federal government “fund research to evaluate how the current regula-
tory and legal systems (1) facilitate or inhibit the changes needed . . . and (2) can be modified to
support health care professionals and organizations that seek to accomplish [the aims set forth in
the report].” Id. at 20.
40. See, generally, two excellent accounts of evolving understanding of and approaches to
error in other sectors: CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECH-
NOLOGIES (1984) and JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR (1990).
41. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. R
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pass an array of influences—organizational, technological,
bureaucratic, and so on—that shape the environment in which care is
delivered. When a medication overdose kills a patient, for example,
the physician’s prescription error and the failure of the physician and
pharmacist to catch it are types of individual factors. The hospital’s
continuing use of handwritten prescriptions (instead of computerized
order entry systems), confusing labels (instead of barcodes), and un-
supervised trainee pharmacist shifts are all system factors.42
When the individual and systems factors interact, as they often do in
the production of medical error, the former are cast as the junior part-
ners in this mix. Although they frequently appear as necessary ele-
ments in the causal chain and may be the most proximate causes,
individual factors are always induced, enabled, amplified, and un-
stopped by upstream, systemic determinants.
This etiological account undergirds the conclusion that prevention
measures must target system factors. As well as being the principal
culprits in the causal chain, they are the most amenable to correction.
System redesign has the potential to stop whole classes of error in
their tracks. Emphasizing behavioral change at the individual level, by
contrast, is a fool’s errand because, well, to err is human.
B. An Inconvenient Truth
Two decades of patient safety research confirms the reports’ charac-
terization of medical error as complex and multifactorial in nature.43
It is also true that the tort system’s frame for understanding how er-
rors occur is too narrow to capture the full range of causal factors, and
sits in some tension with wider efforts to improve safety.44 (This is one
reason we have been critical of the medical liability system and vocal
advocates for the kind of liability reforms discussed in both IOM re-
ports.45) However, in so thoroughly de-emphasizing the importance of
42. For the sake of argument, we describe individual factors and system factors as distinct
here. This is an oversimplification, both because the distinction between them is blurry for some
errors and because they routinely interact as causal factors. Thus, the individual/system distinc-
tion is perhaps better understood as a spectrum, with each type of factor playing a more or less
important role at different points along the spectrum. Our concept of “individual-dominant er-
rors,” see infra Section B.1, accommodates this more nuanced reality.
43. See generally ROBERT WACHTER & KIRAN GUPTA, UNDERSTANDING PATIENT SAFETY
(3d ed. 2017).
44. Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of Individ-
ual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 601 (2008).
45. Id. at 600; Michelle M. Mello et al., “Health Courts” and Accountability for Patient Safety,
84 MILBANK Q. 459, 464–66 (2006); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Com-
pensation for Medical Injuries: The Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217, 217 (2001).
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individual factors in the production of medical error, To Err Is
Human overplayed its hand.
The major flaw in that etiological account is that it assumes a degree
of homogeneity across different types of medical error with respect to
the relative importance of individual and system factors. As we shall
argue, there is a good deal of heterogeneity among errors on this di-
mension. Thus, while rightly stressing the complexity of error causa-
tion, the report overlooked important variation in how different types
of causal factors mix.
1. Individual Dominant Errors
Most medical errors are caused by a combination of individual and
system factors; strands of both are evident in the causal chain, and the
error is unlikely to have occurred without the independent and inter-
twined contributions of both.46 For other errors, system factors are
highly salient and can be considered dominant causes; indeed, there
may be no contribution by a clinician at all, or only an incidental one.
There is a third group of errors—certainly less common than errors in
the first group, and probably less common than those in the second
group—in which the actions (or inactions) of individual clinicians
dominate as causes. System factors may also be in play, but to suggest
that the individual’s role is somehow subordinate to system factors
stretches credulity. Moreover, an attempt to configure the individual
factors as a form of systemic failure summons so spectacularly broad a
conception of what constitutes “systemic” as to render the term quite
meaningless.
Table 1 provides several illustrative examples. Vignette 1 describes
a “system dominant error.” Vignette 2 describes an error in which it
would be difficult to conclude whether system or individual factors
played a dominant causal role. These are textbook examples of ad-
verse events, and the literature is replete with similar examples. Our
focus is to contrast these errors with others whose causality is domi-
nated by failures of individuals. Vignettes 3 and 4 describe such “indi-
vidual dominant errors” (IDEs).
It is useful to divide IDEs into those that are not appreciably more
likely to recur at the hands of the same clinician than at the hands of a
colleague (“type I” IDEs, Vignette 3) and those that stem from some
underlying trait of the clinician that has played a causal role in past
errors, portends an elevated risk of future errors, or both (“type II”
IDEs, Vignette 4). The trait may be incompetence or inexperience,
46. See Mello & Studdert, supra note 44, at 600, 610.
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such as the clinician’s inability to perform a particular procedure
safely. It may be a personality flaw, such as arrogance, lack of insight,
inability to work effectively as part of a team, or unwillingness to learn
from experience. Or the trait may be an impairment, such as fatigue,
mental illness, or addiction, which interferes with the clinician’s ability
to deliver to safe care.
2. System Factors Are Not Always Trumps
We have floated our notion of IDEs in patient-safety circles, and it
gets a cool reception. In discussions with fellow researchers and ex-
perts over the years, several lines of resistance have become familiar.
One line rejects the basic premise that individual factors can stand
alone as causes of error, or eclipse system factors in importance. Ac-
cording to this argument, every individual causal factor is better un-
derstood as a system factor. Characterizing the errors described in the
third and fourth vignettes in Table 1 as individual dominant, for exam-
ple, reflects a unidimensional understanding of the etiology of these
errors. In Vignette 3, a nurse or resident might have corrected Dr. Y’s
error, especially if the hospital’s culture had empowered them to
speak up. In Vignette 4, the error is likely traceable to the hospital
leadership’s willingness to allow Dr. Y to continue to operate.
Taking this approach, one can easily expose the “superficiality” and
“falsehood” of attributing errors primarily to individual factors. In-
deed, the legions of patient-safety consultants who appeared in the
wake of the report would teach the paramountcy of system factors
with case studies designed to re-educate in precisely this way.
Consider another example: A neurosurgeon chooses to conduct a
complex, non-emergent, high-risk procedure with which he has mini-
mal experience in a rural hospital that does not have the staff and
facilities needed to safely support the operation.47 Errors occur during
and after the operation, and the patient experiences a catastrophic
outcome. Any number of system-level interventions may have pre-
vented the harm: “speak up” protocols and training for ancillary prov-
iders; hospital rules prohibiting performance of certain high-risk
procedures; rules regarding when procedures should be referred out
to other institutions; stricter re-credentialing requirements for the
medical staff; and so on.
But the argument that this error, any more than those described in
Vignettes 3 and 4, should be understood primarily as a product of sys-
47. This vignette is an adaptation of the fact pattern in Johnson v. Kokemoor, 525 N.W.2d 71,
74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
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TABLE 1.  SYSTEM DOMINANT ERRORS AND INDIVIDUAL DOMINANT
ERRORS.
Type of 
Error Illustrative Vignette 
System  
dominant 
1. A physician writes a prescription for a new medication for 
which there is a drug-drug interaction. The interaction is se-
vere, but rare and not well-known among providers. The 
hospital has a computerized order entry system and the phy-
sician uses it appropriately in making the prescription, but 
the drug-drug interaction database to which the system refers 
to has not been updated to include this particular interaction. 
The patient takes the new medication, the interaction occurs, 





2. In an effort to save money and standardize care, a hospital 
stops allowing orthopedic surgeons to use whichever pros-
thetic discs they prefer in lumbar disc replacement surgery. 
An exclusive purchasing arrangement is made with Zebra, a 
highly regarded device company. Dr. Y is an orthopedic sur-
geon at the hospital who has limited experience with Zebra 
disc prostheses and the accompanying tools. In one of her 
first operations using a Zebra disc, she inserts it using a tech-
nique that is appropriate for the prosthesis she is accustomed 
to using but inappropriate for Zebra’s prosthesis. The disc 




– type I 
3. Same facts and patient outcome as Vignette 2, except: The 
exclusive switch to Zebra’s disc prosthesis was inconsequen-
tial for Dr. Y because she had been using them for years with 
very good results. It was a momentary and inexplicable lapse 
in her attention during the disc replacement surgery that led 




– type II 
4. Same facts and patient outcome as Vignette 2, with addition-
al facts: The hospital’s Department of Orthopedic Surgery 
led the consolidated purchasing initiative and underwent a 
rigorous consultative process with staff in deciding which de-
vice company to choose. It then organized a series of training 
sessions for surgeons who lacked experience with Zebra 
prostheses. Dr. Y did not participate in the consultation pro-
cess; she had stopped going to department meetings and par-
ticipating in hospital activities years ago. She also rejected 
repeated personalized invitations to enroll in the training ses-
sions, stating in response to one that she was “just too busy 
these days for extra homework.” 
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tem failures is unpersuasive for a couple of reasons. First, it muddles
an ex ante claim about the etiology of error with an ex post claim
about a preferred approach to prevention. To say that a system-level
change may have prevented an IDE is not equivalent to saying a sys-
tem failure caused it. The neurosurgeon’s misjudgment and overconfi-
dence in the example above is crucial to understanding what
happened, as is the orthopedic surgeon’s apathy, arrogance, and isola-
tion in Vignette 4. Moves to de-emphasize such individual causal fac-
tors downplay and likely perpetuate a patient-safety risk.
To be clear, we do not dispute that the optimal interventions for
addressing some (perhaps many) IDEs lie at the system level, not the
individual level. Our point is that the background possibility that a
system-level intervention could have prevented the error cannot re-
make the etiology of an IDE that has already occurred. If this distinc-
tion sounds semantic, it is not; to victims of medical injury who seek
provider accountability, it is sharp and consequential.
A second weakness in the systems-as-trumps argument is that it
rests on undue optimism about the availability and efficacy of preven-
tive measures. It uses a lens that reflects the sanguinity of the IOM
report, not the sobering real-world experience that followed. To re-
turn to the neurosurgery example, could a system-level intervention
really have prevented that adverse outcome? Which intervention, or
combination of interventions, exactly? Has the intervention’s efficacy
in averting the type of harm at issue been demonstrated? Is it feasible
to implement? In ameliorating the targeted safety risk, does it inad-
vertently give rise to others? And can we be confident that it would
have averted the harm in this case? Given the scarcity of patient-safety
interventions with proven efficacy, the standard answers to these
questions are don’t know, maybe, or no. Appeals to the optimality of
system-level interventions to prevent error ring hollow if those inter-
ventions cannot actually be identified or evidence of their efficacy is
lacking.
An alternative line of resistance to IDEs is to accept the construct,
but point to a version of the pragmatic claim articulated in the report.
Namely, even if characterizing these errors as fundamentally individ-
ual in nature is accurate, and even if remedial measures focusing on
individual accountability are indicated, that strategy exacts too high a
toll on the larger safety-improvement enterprise.
This objection has force. However, we are suspicious of it as an ab-
solute claim on two grounds. First, IDEs are more important pieces in
the overall picture of medical error than has been generally assumed,
and as a result, the pragmatic calculus may underestimate the poten-
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tial benefits of strategies aimed at addressing them. Research suggests
that IDEs may account for a small proportion of all adverse events,
and even a minority of the quarter of adverse events that are due to
negligence.48 But there is emerging epidemiological evidence, which
we review in Part V below, that IDEs are nevertheless quite common.
Studies show that malpractice claims and patient complaints are un-
evenly distributed across physicians, with a relatively small group of
“frequent flier” physicians accounting for a substantial proportion of
them. These findings also show that type II IDEs, in particular, may
be a substantial problem in this subpopulation.49 Of course, malprac-
tice claims and patient complaints are the iceberg’s tip. Frequent fliers
treat hundreds of thousands of patients each year, generating many
more poor outcomes that never surface as claims or complaints.
Second, the collateral-damage argument is unsubtle. Simply declar-
ing that pursuing individual accountability for error is objectionable to
rank-and-file practitioners falls back into the old trap of ignoring het-
erogeneity in types of errors and persons who commit them. What if a
subset of practitioners who pose special risks to patients—recurrent
committers of type II IDEs —could be reliably identified and dealt
with in ways that substantially reduced risks to patients? It seems
plausible that other providers would welcome that. It would not es-
cape their notice that these are the same practitioners who are often
refractory to quality-improvement initiatives; who, in team-based care
settings, expose their colleagues to heightened medico-legal risk; and
who threaten the credibility of a blame-free, systems orientation.
Thus, finding effective ways to isolate and manage the relatively
small subgroup of providers who are at high risk for future involve-
ment in certain kinds of errors may well help, not hinder, the wider
patient-safety enterprise. It happens to be a task that legal institutions,
particularly medical boards and liability insurers, are best positioned
to undertake.
48. See Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients,
supra note 3, at 371–72, and Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events, supra note 3,
at 261, both finding that approximately one-quarter of adverse events among hospitalized pa-
tients were due to negligent care. See also Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah
and Colorado, 36 INQUIRY 255, 259 (1999) (finding that 58% of adverse events among hospital-
ized patients in Utah and Colorado in 1992 were preventable).
49. See infra notes 89–92. R
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C. Consequences for Safety Improvement
The patient-safety movement’s over-systematized account of the
etiology of medical error has adversely impacted progress on quality
improvement in at least two ways.
The first relates to disclosure of adverse events to patients and fami-
lies. Following publication of the report, physicians, hospitals, regula-
tors, and accreditation agencies coalesced around the idea that
disclosure was a professional imperative.50 Broad agreement emerged
that patients had a right to know what happened, how it happened,
and what was being done to ensure it would not happen to other pa-
tients. But at the same time that the IOM report propelled disclosure
into routine practice, it undermined its moral force. By emphasizing
errors as systems problems, it undercut physicians’ inclination to com-
municate a meaningful, authentic acceptance of responsibility for
them.
One manifestation of this problem has been the controversy over
whether disclosures should include an apology, and if so, what sort of
apology. In the view of some patient-safety experts, an apology of re-
sponsibility (“I am sorry I/we harmed you”) was a step too far. It
overemphasized human agency and contravened the etiologic para-
digm of a system breakdown. Apologies of sympathy (“I am sorry this
happened”) became prevalent in organizations that adopted this way
of thinking.51 Or, if an apology of responsibility was offered, it was
often done grudgingly and strategically, out of awareness that apology
can be effective in reducing patients’ dissatisfaction and propensity to
sue.52
Patients and family members hear this inauthenticity loud and clear,
and they resent it.53 They want to know that someone is genuinely
50. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, supra note 17, at 2713. R
51. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would Dis-
close Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1585, 1589 (2006).
52. See Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The
University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 125, 143, 159 (2009) [hereinafter
Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims?] (explaining the mecha-
nisms of effect in such programs); Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and
After Implementation of a Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213,
213 (2010) [hereinafter Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs] (finding an association be-
tween the adoption of a communication-and-resolution program and reductions in both malprac-
tice claims volume and malpractice costs at an academic medical center).
53. Jennifer Moore et al., Patients’ Experiences with Communication-and-Resolution Pro-
grams After Medical Injury, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1595, 1599 (2017); Jennifer Moore &
Michelle M. Mello, Improving Reconciliation Following Medical Injury: A Qualitative Study of
Responses to Patient Safety Incidents in New Zealand, 26 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 788, 792
(2017).
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accepting responsibility for what occurred.54 They place trust in their
clinician, and when things go badly, they look to the clinician for an-
swers.55 They have very limited tolerance for descriptions of causal
webs and upstream determinants—convolutions that deflect attention
from the role of people. There is no escaping the reality that families’
reactions to the experience of a harmful medical error, especially an
IDE, include expectations of individual accountability. But the cen-
trality of systems thinking within health care has inhibited the provid-
ers’ capacity to discern and meet this expectation.
A second, more insidious consequence of the report’s conceptual-
ization of medical error and roadmap for addressing it was—certainly
within the quality-improvement enterprise and probably beyond—an
erosion of the legitimacy of legal institutions focused on individual ac-
countability. The two main legal institutions charged with protecting
patients against substandard care are state medical licensing boards
and the tort system, which we collectively call medico-legal agencies
(MLAs). For MLAs, the movement’s manifesto and directions were
marginalizing. They were viewed as non-partners in safety improve-
ment and called upon to try to do as little as possible of what they had
always done.
This was a missed opportunity. To be sure, MLAs’ historical role in
quality improvement has been underwhelming, and in some respects
counterproductive. And there is certainly tension between the vision
and methods of the MLAs and those of the patient-safety movement.
But here was a moment to begin a process of recalibrating the mission
of MLAs and finding new opportunities for them to contribute to
safety improvement. With a few notable exceptions, that did not
happen.
III. CROSSING THE OTHER QUALITY CHASM
The collection of tensions that exist between the respective agendas
of the patient-safety movement and MLAs have been described and
analyzed at length elsewhere.56 For current purposes, it is sufficient to
provide a brief summary of the major ones: differences in perspective,
unit of interest, detection capacity, and transparency. These differ-
54. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of
Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1003 (2003).
55. Moore et al., supra note 53, at 1598 tbl.3, 1601; Moore & Mello, supra note 53, at 793.
56. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles C. Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in
the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 893 (2005); Mello et al., supra note 45; Michelle M. Mello et al., Fostering Rational Regula- R
tion of Patient Safety, 30 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 375 (2005); Studdert & Brennan, supra
note 45. R
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ences collectively comprise a chasm that is broad, deep, and conse-
quential—the other quality chasm.
A. The Other Chasm
The most glaring tension between the patient-safety movement and
MLAs relates to perspective. The central goal of safety-improvement
work is to prevent future errors and harms. Aspects of this work are
backward-looking—for example, root-cause analyses and epidemio-
logical studies of error—but that perspective is instrumental: its over-
riding purpose is to derive lessons for improving care prospectively.
MLAs, by contrast, are intrinsically backward-looking and reactive.
Malpractice actions address specific provider behaviors and patient in-
juries that have already occurred. Disciplinary actions do the same,
although their purview may extend to addressing certain risky behav-
iors that have not (yet) caused actual patient harm.
MLAs’ perspective is also highly circumscribed. Whereas risky pat-
terns of care are the gold nuggets that patient-safety analysts seek to
discover and redress, rules of evidence generally dictate that only acts
and omissions directly responsible for the harm at issue may be con-
sidered in litigation. Thus, courts will usually be required to disregard
a defendant’s checkered history of similar errors as extraneous and
potentially prejudicial to the case at hand.57 With more relaxed evi-
dentiary rules, disciplinary inquiries and hearings have more latitude,
but not a lot more.
Another key point of divergence between the patient-safety move-
ment and MLAs relates to the type of threat to which each responds.
In patient-safety work, all unexpected events, from “near misses” to
catastrophic injuries, matter—regardless of cause or severity. All are
considered useful signals of quality-of-care problems and potentially
valuable inputs for designing prevention strategies. MLAs, in contrast,
have a considerably narrower focus. Malpractice litigation targets neg-
ligent care that causes harm, and disciplinary actions target unprofes-
sional conduct. By patient-safety standards, this approach is
misguided because only a minority of adverse events involve negli-
gence or unprofessional conduct,58 leaving the lion’s share of medical
injury outside MLAs’ field of vision.
57. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Will Physician-Level Measures of Clinical Performance Be
Used in Medical Malpractice Litigation?, 295 JAMA 1831, 1832 (2006).
58. See Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients,
supra note 3, at 371 (estimating that approximately 30% of inpatient adverse events in New York
hospitals in 1984 involved negligence); Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events,
supra note 3, at 261 (estimating that approximately 30% of adverse events in Utah and Colorado
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While true as a general description of the epidemiology of medical
error, this critique elides the fact that preventable adverse events are
the principal target of safety-improvement work. Negligent care is im-
plicated in nearly half those events and in an even higher proportion
of the most serious ones.59 Moreover, the incidence of negligent ad-
verse events is likely to be correlated with the incidence of non-negli-
gent adverse events at both individual and institutional levels. So, if
deterrence worked, targeting the former could have positive spillover
effects on the latter. Thus, if all else were equal, a focus on errors
associated with negligence and misconduct should be a useful comple-
ment to tackling a wider array of adverse events by other means. In
our view, the quarrels patient-safety experts and advocates have with
MLAs’ relatively narrow focus are better understood as a proxy for
other concerns about them, such as MLAs’ emphasis on individual
accountability and their anemic performance in deterring error.
In fact, the most troubling dimension of MLAs’ coarseness is not
the unit of analysis they favor but their poor performance in detecting
it. The gist of this problem is that MLAs net a lot of kelp and let many
sharks swim by.60 Early research into the epidemiology of malpractice
litigation suggested that the kelp—unfounded malpractice claims, or
“false positives”—were a major problem; more recent evidence sug-
gests otherwise.61 Malpractice claims rarely occur in the absence of
patient injury, and they target negligent care more often than not.62
“False negatives,” on the other hand, are a much bigger problem: The
vast majority of injuries caused by negligent care are never litigated.63
hospitals in 1992 involved negligence); Michelle M. Mello et al., Outcomes in Two Massachusetts
Hospital Systems Give Reason for Optimism About Communication-and-Resolution Programs,
36 HEALTH AFF. 1795, 1798, 1801 (2017) (finding that substandard care was implicated in about
a quarter of adverse events reported to risk managers in Massachusetts hospitals).
59. David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a “No-Fault” System of Compensa-
tion for Medical Injury?, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 2; Studdert & Brennan, supra
note 45, at 220. R
60. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MAL-
PRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 75 (1993) (invoking a similar metaphor,
that of a traffic cop who lets many offenders proceed while stopping many law-abiding drivers).
61. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Mal-
practice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006).
62. Id.; A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events
Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245,
245 (1991); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Out-
comes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1966–67 (1996).
63. Helen R. Burstin, Do the Poor Sue More? A Case-Control Study of Malpractice Claims
and Socioeconomic Status, 270 JAMA 1697, 1697–98 (1993); David M. Studdert et al., Negligent
Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 255 (2000)
[hereinafter Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado].
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The false-negative problem almost certainly plagues medical licens-
ing boards, too. The incidence of such sanctions is very low, approach-
ing zero annually in some states.64 With limited resources and
investigative and prosecutorial capacity, boards prioritize forms of
conduct that are relatively easy to detect and prove. Sexual relation-
ships with patients, substance abuse, impairment, and inappropriate
advertising and billing are examples of such conduct. Garden-variety
forms of substandard care and incompetence, on the other hand, are
harder to identify and prove. Consequently, boards tend to pursue
only the most egregious of such cases, and often only after malpractice
litigation has unearthed them and assembled an evidentiary record.65
Finally, MLAs and patient safety part ways on transparency. We
have discussed the premium the movement places on informational
openness, and the threat the liability system is perceived to pose to
that objective. Within MLAs themselves, openness remains a foreign
concept. During the adjudication process, the information is held close
for fear of prejudicing case outcomes. After case closure, detailed in-
formation on what happened is not pooled and subjected to the type
of causal analysis that patient-safety researchers value. It remains
spread across liability insurance companies, attorneys’ offices, the of-
fices of professional boards, and courts. And thanks to confidentiality
agreements among litigants, it is routinely cloaked in a veil of perma-
nent secrecy.66 For patient-safety experts and advocates, this data loss
represents a woeful missed opportunity for learning.
B. Crossing Points
Although the chasm between the patient-safety movement and
MLA approaches remains wide, some bridges have appeared or ex-
tended their arc over the last twenty years. We identify four of these
bridges in this Section and elaborate on a fifth in the next Section.
First, health-services researchers have intensified their efforts to
mine the data trove submerged within the malpractice litigation sys-
tem. As hospital- and state-based adverse event reporting systems
grew in prevalence, awareness dawned that the medical malpractice
64. Sidney M. Wolfe et al., Public Citizen’s Health Research Group Ranking of the Rate of
State Medical Boards’ Serious Disciplinary Actions, 2009-2011, PUB. CITIZEN (May 17, 2012),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/2034.pdf.
65. Haavi Morreim, Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of Dodging the
Data Bank, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109, 163 (2012). See also generally TROYEN A.
BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, NEW RULES: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND THE QUALITY
OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1996).
66. See generally Michelle M. Mello & Jeffrey N. Catalano, Should Malpractice Settlements Be
Secret?, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1135 (2015).
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system naturally generated much of the information those reporting
systems sought to collect. Litigation was, in a sense, an adverse event
reporting system of its own. It was a biased reporting system, to be
sure, skewed toward adverse events that involved severe injuries and
suspected negligence. It eventually became clear, however, that every
reporting system suffered from one form of selective reporting or an-
other, sometimes dramatically so. Thus, the bias evident in malprac-
tice claims data could hardly be considered a fatal flaw.
In figuring out how to harness the value of claims data, an unlikely
group lit the way: anesthesiologists. As early as 1984, a research team
based at the University of Washington with ties to the American Col-
lege of Anesthesiology nurtured relationships with several dozen lia-
bility insurers and developed tools and methods for periodically
harvesting those insurers’ claims data. The researchers then used the
data to study a range of problems in anesthesia and develop safety-
enhancing interventions, with impressive results.67
Their success inspired other efforts, including several studies led by
Harvard-based teams.68 The broadest of these efforts was the Mal-
practice Insurers Medical Error Prevention Study (MIMEPS) in the
early 2000s, which sought to apply the anesthesiologists’ approach to a
wider range of clinical areas.69 Drawing on the claim review method-
ology developed in the MIMEPS project, the Controlled Risk Insur-
ance Company (CRICO), the professional liability insurer for the
67. Frederick W. Cheney, The American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project:
What Have We Learned, How Has It Affected Practice, and How Will It Affect Practice in the
Future?, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 552 (1999).
68. For a description of three studies that were designed to address quality problems (in emer-
gency, critical, and surgical care, respectively) and were motivated in part by problems identified
in the Harvard hospitals’ malpractice claims experience, see Helen R. Burstin et al., Benchmark-
ing and Quality Improvement: The Harvard Emergency Department Quality Study, 107 AM. J.
MED. 437 (1999); Jeffrey P. Burns et al., Results of a Clinical Trial on Care Improvement for the
Critically Ill, 31 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2107 (2003); and Atul A. Gawande et al., Risk Factors for
Retained Instruments and Sponges After Surgery, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229 (2003). See also
infra note 69. R
69. See generally Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Mal-
practice Litigation, supra note 61. For other products of the MIMEPS project, see Tejal K. Gan- R
dhi et al., Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Ambulatory Setting: A Study of Closed
Malpractice Claims, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 488 (2006); Caprice C. Greenberg et al., Pat-
terns of Communication Breakdowns Resulting in Injury to Surgical Patients, 204 J. AM. C. SUR-
GEONS 533 (2007); Allen Kachalia et al., Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Emergency
Department: A Study of Closed Malpractice Claims from 4 Liability Insurers, 49 ANNALS EMER-
GENCY MED. 196 (2007); Scott E. Regenbogen et al., Patterns of Technical Error Among Surgical
Malpractice Claims: An Analysis of Strategies to Prevent Injury to Surgical Patients, 246 ANNALS
SURGERY 705 (2007); Selwyn O. Rogers et al., Analysis of Surgical Errors in Closed Malpractice
Claims at 4 Liability Insurers, 140 SURGERY 25 (2006); Hardeep Singh et al., Medical Errors
Involving Trainees: A Study of Closed Malpractice Claims from 5 Insurers, 167 ARCHIVES INTER-
NAL MED. 2030 (2007).
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Harvard-affiliated hospitals, established a business subsidiary to offer
a service that harvested information from claim files. Dozens of insur-
ers and providers now share their data and approximately thirty per-
cent of all closed malpractice claims in the United States are subjected
to this systematic review.70 The data are analyzed to identify causal
factors, and the organizations that provided them receive benchmark-
ing and other feedback.
Second, many liability insurers have become advocates for trans-
parency and disclosure following adverse events. To be sure, many still
crouch in the traditional “deny and defend” position, but they are in-
creasingly regarded in the professional liability community as dino-
saurs. Progressive organizations communicate expectations to their
insureds that adverse events will be disclosed to patients, and they
offer guidelines and supports to help ensure these conversations go
well. For example, guidelines issued by CRICO highlight important
needs that injured patients have and urge providers to obtain just-in-
time disclosure coaching before initiating communications.71
Third, a growing number of liability insurers have implemented al-
ternative approaches to patient compensation that are more compati-
ble with patient-safety objectives.72 Known as “communication-and-
resolution programs” (CRPs) these approaches combine disclosure
with rapid investigation and proactive offers of compensation in cases
where an error caused serious harm.73 Such programs have attracted
interest from hospital systems and liability insurers primarily because
early adopters achieved radical reductions in claims costs,74 but they
are also appealing because they promote transparency about adverse
70. CRICO, How Does Your Organization Compare?, HARVARD, https://
www.rmf.harvard.edu/Products-and-Services/CRICO-Strategies-Products-and-Services/CBS
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
71. Debbie LaValley, Guidelines for Disclosure, HARVARD (Sept. 12, 2016), https://
www.rmf.harvard.edu/Clinician-Resources/Guidelines-Algorithms/2009/Guidelines-for-
Disclosure.
72. Some insurers even market these programs as a customer benefit that differentiates them
from competitors, under the mantle of “de-escalation services.” See, e.g., Claims, COVERYS,
https://www.coverys.com/Services/Claims (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (“In some instances, litiga-
tion can be avoided by responding effectively when a dispute first emerges. To help you leverage
this important window, we offer a proprietary service known as REACT—free to eligible policy-
holders . . . .”).
73. For a general overview of the approach, see Boothman et al., supra note 52; Mello et al., R
supra note 58; About CARe, MACRMI, http://www.macrmi.info/about-macrmi/about-dao/ R
#sthash.SF4ztdbq.dpbs (last visited Jan. 24, 2019); Communication & Resolution Programs, COL-
LABORATIVE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY & IMPROVEMENT, http://communicationandresolution.org/
communication-and-resolution-programs/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
74. See Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs, supra note 52, at 213; Bruce L. Lambert et R
al., The “Seven Pillars” Response to Patient Safety Incidents: Effects on Medical Liability
Processes and Outcomes, 51 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 2491, 2491–92 (2016).
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events, as well as learning from errors.75 Indeed, leading proponents
of the CRP model, such as Richard Boothman at the University of
Michigan Health System, characterize the model as a patient-safety
program first and a risk-management program second.76
Fourth, although state medical boards look, in many respects, much
as they did a half-century ago,77 advances in a few areas reflect the
ideals of the patient-safety movement. One remarkable shift has oc-
curred in Washington, where the Medical Quality Assurance Commis-
sion (MQAC) had long maintained a reputation as one of the most
punitive boards in the country. MQAC agreed to partner with a group
of researchers at the University of Washington78 and the Washington
State Foundation for Health Care Quality to pilot a new regulatory
approach known as “CRP Certification.”79 Certification involves a
panel of CRP experts and patient advocates reviewing CRP cases that
have been voluntarily submitted by the involved facility, insurer, or
clinician to determine whether the response to the event on the part
of the hospital, the insurer, or both faithfully included all of the key
elements of the CRP process: timely reporting and disclosure of the
adverse event, event analysis and prevention planning, resolution
communications with the patient, and disseminated learning.80 If so,
the case is deemed “CRP Certified,” and the presumption is that
MQAC will close such cases as satisfactorily resolved without impos-
75. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? supra note 52, at 139, R
145–46 (discussing the patient-safety benefits of the University of Michigan Health System’s
program); Mello et al., supra note 58, at 1795–96 (finding that Massachusetts communication- R
and-resolution programs frequently identified safety-improvement interventions based on their
investigations).
76. Richard C. Boothman et al., Nurturing a Culture of Patient Safety and Achieving Lower
Malpractice Risk Through Disclosure: Lessons Learned and Future Directions, 28 FRONTIERS
HEALTH SERVS. MGMT. 13, 17 (2012) (“To understand the Michigan Model, it is critical to un-
derstand that the claims management process is only the public face of an organic culture shift
that seeks to elevate patient safety to the foreground and relegate claims considerations to the
background.”).
77. See generally BRENNAN & BERWICK, supra note 65; MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGU- R
LATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE
(2000).
78. One of us (M.M.) has been involved in this initiative, which is being led by Tom Gallagher
at the University of Washington.
79. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Collaboration with Regulators to Support Quality and Ac-
countability Following Medical Errors: The Communication and Resolution Program Certifica-
tion Pilot, 51 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 2569, 2572 (2016) [Gallagher et al., Collaboration with
Regulators to Support Quality and Accountability Following Medical Errors].
80. Thomas H. Gallagher, CRP Certification: Promoting Accountability and Learning After
Adverse Events, GRANTOME, http://grantome.com/grant/NIH/R18-HS024504-01 (last visited Jan.
24, 2019).
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ing discipline.81 The CRP Certification program enshrines several pil-
lars of the patient-safety movement: the notion that disciplinary
process may unfairly blame individual providers for systems failures; a
preference for nonpunitive processes of adverse-event investigation
and resolution; and involvement of patients and patient advocates in
event resolution and learning.82 The program has faced a number of
challenges in launching,83 but represents an important step toward a
different kind of role for medical boards.
Although the Washington experiment is sui generis, at least for now,
a broader initiative among state medical boards has been to
strengthen the showings that practitioners must make concerning their
continuing competence in order to renew their licenses. In 2010, the
Federation of State Medical Boards, which represents and supports
seventy medical and osteopathic boards in the United States and its
territories,84 adopted a framework for “Maintenance of Licensure.”
The framework recommended that member boards require practition-
ers to regularly participate in three types of activities: (1) “reflective
self-assessment” of their areas of strength and weakness; (2) objective
assessments of skills and knowledge, which could include examina-
tions administered by medical specialty boards;85 and (3) evaluations
of their performance in actual clinical practice.86 Although individual
state boards have discretion over implementing the framework and
many are still in the process of doing so, adoption of the framework is
a sign that boards as a group are taking seriously their obligation to
81. “Cases involving providers who pose a significant risk of harm to patients through gross
incompetence, recklessness, boundary violations, provider impairment, or intentional miscon-
duct are ineligible for CRP certification.” Gallagher et al., Collaboration with Regulators to Sup-
port Quality and Accountability Following Medical Errors, supra note 79, at 2574. One reason for R
this carveout is to keep frequent fliers squarely on MQAC’s radar screen.
82. Id. at 2569–71.
83. Id. at 2577–79.
84. About FSMB, FED’N ST. MED. BOARDS, https://www.fsmb.org/about-fsmb/ (last visited
Jan. 24, 2019).
85. In a parallel “maintenance of certification” movement, medical specialty boards, which
certify physicians as competent in particular clinical specialties, have increasingly adopted main-
tenance of certification requirements that require practitioners to submit to periodic examina-
tions to demonstrate their continuing competence and to participate in various quality-
improvement initiatives. These requirements have confronted heated opposition from physicians
and remain controversial. Kachalia et al., Legal and Policy Interventions to Improve Patient
Safety, supra note 11, at 665. The FSMB’s maintenance of licensure framework envisions that R
participation in maintenance of certification activities would satisfy the maintenance of licensure
requirements. Humayun J. Chaudhry et al., Maintenance of Licensure: Supporting a Physician’s
Commitment to Lifelong Learning, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 287, 288 (2012).
86. Chaudhry et al., supra note 85, at 287–88; DAVID A. JOHNSON & HUMAYUN J. CHAUD- R
HRY, MEDICAL LICENSING AND DISCIPLINE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE FEDERATION OF
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS 263 (2012).
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actively monitor provider competence, as opposed to merely reacting
to reports of serious competence problems that arrive on their
doorstep.
In summary, there are several ways MLAs have begun bridging the
chasm that separates them from the patient-safety movement. These
moves are tentative and by no means widespread, but nonetheless in-
dicate that these actors are capable of re-envisioning their role in com-
bating medical errors. As we discuss in the following Section, there is
much more they could do. In particular, they could, and should, im-
prove their capacity to identify and address the safety risks posed by
problem physicians.
IV. A PROMISING TOEHOLD: FREQUENT FLIERS
Dr. X, a cardiologist, has been sued three times in the last three
years—a significantly higher rate than the regional average for cardi-
ologists. Two of the suits ended in settlement payments. Dr. X was
also censured by the state medical board for a fourth incident follow-
ing the board’s investigation of a patient complaint. Dr. X’s liability
insurer, The RiskShrink Group, assisted Dr. X in all four disputes
and retains detailed information on them.
RiskShrink routinely uses a predictive algorithm to determine risks
of future medico-legal events for each of its insured practitioners. The
algorithm combines information on practitioners’ demographic char-
acteristics, specialty, clinical load, practice location and setting, and
past events to produce an individualized risk score. Dr. X’s score is
high, indicating a substantial risk of additional claims and/or discipli-
nary actions within the next two years.
RiskShrink responds by conducting an internal review of Dr. X’s
cases.
Summaries of the cases suggest they are unrelated, but closer analy-
sis shows otherwise. All three plaintiffs had coronary artery disease
and heart failure. Dr. X placed stents in each patient and all of them
suffered myocardial infarctions within six months. Reports from sev-
eral of the plaintiffs’ experts criticized the post-procedure medication
regimen: They opined that Dr. X prescribed three or four drugs to
each patient, not the five-drug regimen (clopidogrel, ace inhibitor,
beta blocker, aspirin, and statin) that is considered best practice.
In addition, the analysis shows that two of the claims and the com-
plaint involved secondary allegations regarding the informed consent
process that preceded the stent procedure. The patients claim that Dr.
X rushed them into agreeing, did not adequately explain risks, and
was dismissive of their questions about possible complications.
RiskShrink asks two senior cardiologists from other hospitals to
interview Dr. X. Both confirm that his medication knowledge is out-
of-date and that, after repeatedly citing his decades of clinical experi-
ence, he was resistant to accepting that the five-drug regimen consti-
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tutes best practice. The cardiologists’ report also notes that, in
discussing the malpractice cases, Dr. X was very critical of the liabil-
ity system and appeared to lack empathy for the patients who had
died under his care.
RiskShrink advises Dr. X that continuing liability coverage at the
standard, specialty-wide rate is contingent on his undertaking two
week-long training courses within three months: one in managing pa-
tients with coronary heart disease and another in general communica-
tion skills. It identifies the programs, enrolls Dr. X, requests
certificates of completion, and advises the medical board of its ac-
tions. It renews Dr. X’s coverage, but places him on a list of insureds
for whom any additional complaint or legal action triggers immediate
notification to RiskShrink’s Chief Medical Officer.
This scenario is science fiction. Liability insurers today do not sys-
tematically estimate individual physicians’ risks of future claims and
complaints, and if they respond at all to situations like Dr. X’s, it is to
simply terminate his coverage. This is unfortunate. MLAs are well-
positioned to do much more; they could make an important contribu-
tion to identifying and intervening with risky practitioners, particu-
larly those whose track records evince type II IDEs. Although such an
approach focuses on individuals, it is thoroughly consistent with core
tenets of patient safety, including event surveillance, pattern analysis,
and prevention. Not pursuing it may be MLAs’ biggest missed oppor-
tunity to come off the patient-safety movement’s sidelines and join the
game.
Two emerging findings from empirical research underscore the po-
tential value of initiatives to mitigate the risks posed by frequent fliers
like Dr. X. One finding is the significance of claim- and complaint-
prone physicians to the overall burden of these events. The other is
mounting optimism that it is technically feasible to reliably identify
such practitioners early in their event trajectories. In this section, we
review the research and briefly consider what it would take for MLAs
to make a meaningful contribution on this front.
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A. Frequent Fliers87
It has long been recognized that some physicians experience sub-
stantially more claims and complaints than their peers.88 Several stud-
ies in the 1980s and 1990s, most analyzing claims from single insurers,
showed a marked clustering of the claims among some physicians that
could not be explained by observable demographic and specialty char-
acteristics.89 More recent studies using larger datasets, multiple data
sources, and longer timelines have brought the maldistribution of
medico-legal events into sharper focus and highlighted its significance
at the population level.90 Our recent study of paid malpractice claims
in the United States between 2005 and 2014, for example, found that
1% of all physicians accounted for one third of all claims,91 which was
almost identical to the concentration detected in a national study of
patient complaints lodged against physicians in Australia.92
87. Portions of the text in subsections A, B, and C appeared in the following post, written for
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s “Perspectives on Safety” series: David
Studdert, Doctors with Multiple Malpractice Claims, Disciplinary Actions, and Complaints: What
Do We Know?, AHRQ: PATIENT SAFETY NETWORK (July 2017), https://psnet.ahrq.gov/
perspectives/perspective/229/doctors-with-multiple-malpractice-claims-disciplinary-actions-and-
complaints-what-do-we-know.
88. Thomas H. Gallagher & Wendy Levinson, Physicians with Multiple Patient Complaints:
Ending Our Silence, 22 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 521, 521 (2013); Kaveh G. Shojania & Mary
Dixon-Woods, ‘Bad Apples’: Time to Redefine as a Type of Systems Problem?, 22 BMJ QUALITY
& SAFETY 528, 528 (2013).
89. See, e.g., T. Elaine Adamson et al., Characteristics of Surgeons with High and Low Mal-
practice Claims Rates, 166 W. J. MED. 37 (1997); Randall R. Bovbjerg & Kenneth R. Petronis,
The Relationship Between Physicians’ Malpractice Claims History and Later Claims: Does the
Past Predict the Future?, 272 JAMA 1421 (1994); Gerald Hickson et al., Development of an Early
Identification and Response Model of Malpractice Prevention, 27 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8
(1997); Frank A. Sloan et al., Medical Malpractice Experience of Physicians: Predictable or Hap-
hazard?, 262 JAMA 3291 (1989); Mark I. Taragin et al., Physician Demographics and the Risk of
Medical Malpractice, 93 AM. J. MED. 537 (1992).
90. Marie M. Bismark et al., Identification of Doctors at Risk of Recurrent Complaints: A
National Study of Healthcare Complaints in Australia, 22 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 532 (2013);
Gerald B. Hickson, et al., Patient Complaints and Malpractice Risk, 287 JAMA 2951 (2002);
Kaushik Mukherjee et al., All Trauma Surgeons Are Not Created Equal: Asymmetric Distribu-
tion of Malpractice Claims Risk, 69 J. TRAUMA 549 (2010); Adam C. Schaffer et al., Rates and
Characteristics of Paid Malpractice Claims Among US Physicians by Specialty, 1992–2014, 177
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 710 (2017); David M. Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of
Physicians Prone to Malpractice Claims, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 354 (2016) [hereinafter Studdert
et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Physicians Prone to Malpractice Claims].
91. Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Physicians Prone to Malpractice Claims,
supra note 90, at 356. R
92. Bismark et al., supra note 90, at 534–35. We note that distributional statistics of this kind R
must be interpreted with caution. They do not include information on the incidence of the events
in the underlying population, which is influential. To illustrate, consider an extreme example: In
a population of 100 physicians in which only 1 claim is filed against one of them in a specified
period, 1% of the physicians would account for 100% of claims. Such basic distributional statis-
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Not much is known about the personal characteristics and traits of
frequent fliers. A dozen or so studies stretching back to the 1980s pro-
filed physicians who experienced one or more claims and complaints,
typically by comparing them to peers with unblemished records.
Those studies identified some consistent risk factors, both on the phy-
sician side (e.g., poor communication skills93 and male gender94) and
the patient side (e.g., occurrence of severe adverse outcomes95). How-
ever, it is not appropriate to extrapolate characteristics of frequent
fliers from these results. Frequent fliers constitute a fraction of the
much larger group of physicians with one or two claims and com-
plaints, and it is a subgroup that may well be distinctive.
Few studies have explicitly sought to identify characteristics of fre-
quent fliers.96 Compared to physicians who experience no or few
events, they are more likely to be male, international medical gradu-
ates, and work in certain high-risk specialties (e.g., orthopedic surgery
tics have more meaning over longer periods of time and in large populations in which the aver-
age level of claims risk is not close to zero.
93. Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The Relationship with Malprac-
tice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553 (1997); Gerald B.
Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal
Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992).
94. Emily Unwin et al., Sex Differences in Medico-Legal Action Against Doctors: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 13 BMC MED. 172 (2015).
95. See, e.g., Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, supra note 63 (examining the relationship between adverse events and malpractice R
claiming). Some interpreted evidence of the poor correlation between the incidence of claims
and both adverse events and negligent adverse events as indicating that such events did not
predict claims. That is not correct. The medical injury studies in New York, Utah, and Colorado
showed very clearly that both medical injury and negligent care were risk factors for claims and
for claims that led to payments. See Michelle M. Mello & David Hemenway, Medical Malprac-
tice as an Epidemiological Problem, 59 SOC. SCI. & MED. 39, 39–40 (2004).
96. See generally Bismark et al., supra note 90; Mukherjee et al., supra note 90; Sloan et al., R
supra note 89; Matthew J. Spittal et al., The PRONE Score: An Algorithm for Predicting Doc- R
tors’ Risks of Formal Patient Complaints Using Routinely Collected Administrative Data, 24 BMJ
QUALITY & SAFETY 360 (2015); Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Physicians
Prone to Malpractice Claims, supra note 90; Taragin et al., supra note 89. R
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and obstetrics and gynecology).97 Findings are mixed regarding
whether physician age is a risk factor.98
B. Past as Prelude?
Missing from the list of distinctive characteristics discussed above is
the most obvious one: prior events. Given the clustering phenomenon,
it may seem axiomatic that past claims are an important predictor of
future ones. But this does not necessarily follow, and merely identify-
ing clustering does not quantify the importance of prior events rela-
tive to other characteristics. The early studies comparing physicians
with no claims to those with at least one shed no light here: because
claims history defined the comparison groups, it could not be ex-
amined as a predictor.
The extent to which prior claims and complaints portend future
ones has been the subject of some debate, dating back to the early
1990s, around the time when the National Practitioner Data Bank was
launched.99 A founding premise of the Data Bank was that arming
health care institutions with information about the medico-legal histo-
ries of physicians who sought to affiliate with them was a useful step
for improving quality and safety of care. If, however, those histories
were an unreliable indicator of future medico-legal risk, the premise
was questionable. Commentators from within the liability industry
raised doubts; they stressed that meritless malpractice claims were
often settled when the costs of defending them were likely to exceed
their “pay-off” value; that blurred the connection between claims his-
tory and competence, and thus between claims history and risk of
97. See Bismark et al., supra note 90, at 536 (finding male gender, membership of certain R
specialties, and older age were risk factors for recurrent complaints); Sloan et al., supra note 90, R
at 3295 (finding that female and older physicians were at a lower risk of repeated claims,
whereas physicians in certain specialties were at a higher risk); Spittal et al., The PRONE Score,
supra note 96, at 364; Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Physicians Prone to Mal- R
practice Claims, supra note 90, at 359 (finding membership of certain specialties and male gen- R
der, as well as training outside of the United States, were risk factors for recurrent malpractice
claims that resulted in payments, however physician age was not a significant risk factor);
Taragin et al., supra note 90, at 539 (finding that physicians with larger numbers of claims were R
more likely to be in certain specialties and male).
98. See sources cited supra note 97. R
99. Bovbjerg & Petronis, supra note 89; John E. Rolph et al., Malpractice Claims Data as a R
Quality Improvement Tool. II. Is Targeting Effective?, 266 JAMA 2093 (1991) [hereinafter Rolph
et al., Malpractice Claims Data as a Quality Improvement Tool]; Lawrence E. Smarr, Malpractice
Claims—Does the Past Predict the Future?, 272 JAMA 1453 (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/IMTEC-92-56, PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: INFORMATION ON SMALL MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE PAYMENTS (1992).
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claims recurrence.100 Proponents of the Data Bank, on the other hand,
were so sure of claims’ predictive value that they advocated for ex-
panding the repository’s reach beyond closed claims to matters still
proceeding through the litigation process.101
A close reading of the literature from this period suggests that the
opposing sides talked past one another on several points. The con-
cerns of leading skeptics centered on the predictive value of small
malpractice payments, not claims in general. More importantly, the
word “prediction” has multiple meanings and is often used loosely.102
In this instance, much of the disagreement over the “predictive” value
of physicians’ claims history appears to have arisen from confusion
over two related but distinct questions: (1) do prior events explain
risk, in the sense that they signal elevated risk of future claims?; and
(2) is it feasible to use claims history to accurately predict claims at the
physician level in large groups?
These are distinct questions because a characteristic can be strongly
and independently associated with an outcome, and thus a significant
“predictor” of that outcome, as that term is commonly used in regres-
sion analysis. Nonetheless it still may be statistically infeasible to use
as a reliable basis for prospectively identifying individuals in a popula-
tion who will experience the outcome. The relationship between de-
pression and suicide helps to illustrate the point. People who die by
suicide are much more likely to be depressed than people who do not.
Yet it has not proven feasible to accurately predict suicide using de-
tailed information about patients’ histories of depression, in part be-
cause depression is prevalent in the general population and suicide is
rare.103
With respect to the first question posed above—do prior events sig-
nal elevated risk of future claims? The answer is indisputably yes. At
any given moment in time, risks of claims and complaints are signifi-
cantly higher among physicians with poor medico-legal track records
than among physicians with clean records.104 Indeed, of all physician
characteristics that are routinely observed by MLAs, prior events are
100. Smarr, supra note 99, at 1453; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 99, at 9; OF- R
FICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-OI-90-00521, NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: MALPRACTICE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 1, 5 (1992).
101. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 100, at 1–2. R
102. See generally Galit Shmeuli, To Explain or to Predict?, 25 STAT. SCI. 289 (2010).
103. See generally Joseph C. Franklin et al., Risk Factors for Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors:
A Meta-Analysis of 50 Years of Research, 143 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187 (2017).
104. See generally Sloan et al., supra note 89; Bovjerg & Petronis, supra note 89; Hickson et R
al., supra note 90; Bismark et al., supra note 90; Studdert et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of R
Physicians Prone to Malpractice Claims, supra note 90. R
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easily the strongest risk factor for future ones. Past isn’t always prel-
ude, but it’s a very useful marker of future risk.
The answer to the second question—whether it is possible to use
this and other information to reliably identify who, in a large group of
physicians, will experience future events—is less clear.
C. Prediction
A series of studies in the 1980s and early 1990s explored whether
physicians’ claims history could be combined with other readily-ob-
servable characteristics, such as gender and specialty, to identify with
reasonable accuracy physicians who would go on to experience mal-
practice claims.105 These studies were motivated chiefly by a desire to
assess the feasibility of “experience rating” the premiums physicians
paid for liability insurance coverage (that is, calibrating the price a
physician pays for insurance to the physician’s claims history). Ac-
cordingly, the study designs involved statistical models that attempted
to predict which physicians in an insurance pool would attract one or
more claims. None of these studies focused specifically on frequent
fliers. The broad conclusion of this body of research was that reliable
prediction at the physician level was not possible.106
Several recent studies of patient complaints and malpractice claims
have revisited the prediction question.107 Their focus has been some-
what different: to investigate whether it is feasible to accurately iden-
tify which physicians, among those who have already attracted one or
two claims or complaints, will attract more in the near term. The re-
sults are more promising than those from the earlier studies.
For example, a 2015 study of formal patient complaints to state reg-
ulators in Australia by Matthew Spittal and colleagues showed that
four variables—number of prior complaints, time passed since the last
105. Bruce Cooil, Using Medical Malpractice Data to Predict the Frequency of Claims, 85 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 285 (1991); Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 51 (1991); Robert D. Gibbons et al., A Random-Effects Probit Model for Predicting Medi-
cal Malpractice Claims, 89 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 760 (1994); Rolph et al., Malpractice Claims Data
as a Quality Improvement Tool, supra note 99; John E. Rolph, Some Statistical Evidence on Merit R
Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 48 J. RISK INS. 247 (1981); Emilio C. Venezian et al.,
The Distribution of Claims for Professional Malpractice: Some Statistical and Public Policy As-
pects, 56 J. RISK INS. 686 (1989); Derek A. Weycker & Gail A. Jensen, Medical Malpractice
Physicians: Who Will Be Sued and Who Will Pay?, 3 HEALTH CARE MGMT. SCI. 269 (2000).
106. Bismark et al., supra note 90, at 532. R
107. Bismark et al., supra note 90; Spittal et al., The PRONE Score, supra note 96; Matthew J. R
Spittal et al., The PRONE-HP Score: An Algorithm to Identify Practitioners at High Risk of
Complaints to Health and Medical Regulators (2019) [hereinafter Spittal et al., The PRONE-HP
Score] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Studdert et al., Prevalence and Charac-
teristics of Physicians Prone to Malpractice Claims, supra note 90. R
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complaint, specialty, and gender—explained 70% of the variation in
risk of additional complaints among a group of physicians who had
already experienced at least one complaint.108 The researchers also
developed a simple risk algorithm, the “PRONE score,” based on
these parameters and found it performed well in predicting physicians’
risks of future complaints. The researchers recently extended their
method to medical board complaints, with similarly encouraging re-
sults.109 Their 2015 report concluded:
A risk calculator, like the PRONE score, could be deployed ret-
rospectively or prospectively. As part of a general case load review,
such an algorithm could be applied to identify practitioners at high-
est risk of further events and in need of prompt intervention. An-
other approach would be to incorporate the tool into day-to-day
handling of complaints or claims, giving regulators an ability to ob-
serve ascending levels of risk and tailor responses accordingly. The
potential for prospective use is particularly novel and exciting be-
cause it holds the promise of ushering medicolegal agencies into the
prevention business.110
D. Stepping Up
If prediction of claims and complaints is feasible for certain high-
risk physicians, why aren’t MLAs doing it? What would it take for
them to step up into the kind of role the fictional RiskShrink Group
played in the Dr. X scenario?
1. Why Frequent-Flier Programs Are Rare
We have discussed the emerging evidence on the importance of fre-
quent fliers with leaders of several major liability insurance compa-
nies. It is apparent that they are aware of the problem and have
concerns. But, given the eye-popping statistics on the extent of clus-
tering, what is most striking in these conversations is how low a prior-
ity addressing the problem seems to be.
There is an obvious explanation: Liability insurers already have a
way of addressing the problem, one that is simpler and cheaper than
the approach we have described above. The standard strategy for
dealing with physicians who incur multiple “strikes,” at least among
major commercial and captive liability insurers, is to show them the
door. This eliminates the problem for the insurer going forward.111
108. Spittal et al., The PRONE Score, supra note 96, at 362. R
109. Spittal et al., The PRONE-HP Score, supra note 107. R
110. Spittal et al., The PRONE Score, supra note 96, at 366–67. R
111. The insurer may still have responsibility for claims that are yet to be reported but relate
to incidents that occurred during the covered period. Some insurance policies (known as “occur-
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However, it does not eliminate the safety threat these physicians pose;
it merely makes it someone else’s problem. Indeed, it may well en-
large the threat because when Dr. X heads to other pastures, his erst-
while insurer’s detailed knowledge of his history heads into record
storage. Future employers, insurers, and colleagues are unlikely to
have any more information on the risks posed by Dr. X than the skel-
etal information available from the National Practitioner Data Bank.
Fragmentation of responsibility for physicians across dozens of lia-
bility insurers and state medical boards thus creates a collective-action
problem in dealing with frequent fliers. It should be fixed. Ideally, this
would be done voluntarily by key leadership organizations, such as the
Physician Insurers Association of America and the Federation of
State Medical Boards. But if they cannot or will not do it, then gov-
ernment regulation may be required.
The fact that it is simpler to get rid of a physician than to improve
his care is probably the most important reason why MLAs have not
moved to initiate programs to address the risks and costs posed by
frequent-fliers. But there are technical barriers too. The kind of pre-
dictive modeling we have outlined above requires advanced skills in
quantitative analysis, which few MLAs have in house. Liability insur-
ers are accustomed to commissioning and studying risk models, typi-
cally from actuaries and reinsurers. However, that group-level
financial modeling is a different species of prediction from the ap-
proach outlined above. Identifying Dr. X and remediating the risks he
poses necessitate development of robust, individual-level risk models
that are informed by expertise in legal process, clinical medicine, pa-
tient safety, and statistics. Most MLAs will need technical help from
external partners, which may include academic researchers or com-
mercial analytics firms, in order to design and implement large-scale
predictive modeling tools.
2. Encouraging the Growth of Frequent-Flier Programs
A clearer understanding of frequent fliers and IDEs would help
build momentum to address them. As is evident from our earlier re-
view of relevant research, knowledge of these practitioners remains
rudimentary.
rence” policies) provide this type of coverage. In contrast, “claims-made” policies only cover
claims filed during the coverage period. Insurers may offer optional “tail coverage” policies that
allow physicians to extend coverage beyond the termination date of their claims-made policy.
See Scott Dutton, What Is Malpractice Tail Coverage?, STUDENT DR. NETWORK (Nov. 28, 2012),
https://www.studentdoctor.net/2012/11/28/what-is-malpractice-tail-coverage/.
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One set of questions relates to frequent fliers’ professional trajec-
tory. What proportion of frequent fliers continue to work after ac-
cumulating multiple claims or complaints, and where? Are they driven
into solo practice, as hospitals and fellow practitioners cut ties? Which
organizations credential them? Who provides them with liability in-
surance? Does their patient load dwindle or their patient mix shift to
less complex cases as their problematic track record accumulates? Are
the physicians who continue to refer to them unaware of their history?
Are frequent fliers relatively itinerant, “starting fresh” in places where
their reputation does not precede them or where physician shortages
make it imperative for the community to accept all comers?112
Another set of questions relates to factors that drive IDEs and re-
currence. To what extent does a physician’s accumulation of events
spring from innate personal limitations that cut across multiple dimen-
sions of care (e.g., poor communication skills, lack of insight), as op-
posed to more circumscribed shortcomings (e.g., lack of competence
to perform a particular procedure)? What does the periodicity of a
typical event series look like? A succession of events accumulated in a
short period of time may signal a different kind of quality problem
(e.g., a decrement in job performance due to a life crisis event) than a
series accumulated steadily over an extended period. A physician-
level study of event typologies and timing among frequent fliers would
be revealing.
Filling these knowledge gaps would help to define the contours of
the problem and devise intervention strategies. It would also help cat-
alyze public expectations for MLAs to act. However, risk identifica-
tion alone, even if done superbly, cannot improve safety. To make a
difference on the ground, it must operate as the front end of a risk-
reduction strategy, guiding application of interventions that effectively
mitigate risk. To encourage the growth of frequent-flier programs, the
evidence regarding what works to mitigate the risks posed by problem
physicians needs to be expanded.
Ideally, MLAs would have a suite of interventions at their disposal
to tackle frequent fliers. For a given clinician, an intervention would
be selected to match the level and nature of risk presented.113 Inter-
ventions would run the gamut of intensity, from simply notifying a
practitioner of his elevated risk of a future event to suspension of the
practitioner’s medical license or insurance. In the middle of this spec-
112. In a forthcoming paper, we seek to address some of these questions. See David M. Stud-
dert et al., Changes in Practice Among Physicians with Malpractice Claims (2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
113. See Spittal et al., supra note 96, at 366–67. R
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trum lie peer-intervention strategies, targeted education and training,
as well as various rehabilitative options, including medical treatment
for impaired practitioners.114
MLAs themselves may not be the best organizations to design or
deliver these interventions, but they should partner with organizations
that can. Globally, the best-known existing program aimed at risk
identification and intervention with problem physicians is the Patient
Advocacy Reporting System (PARS) developed at Vanderbilt Univer-
sity.115 Over 140 hospitals nationwide now participate.116
Do approaches like PARS work in reducing risks posed by problem
physicians? A modest body of evidence indicates that some are effec-
tive.117 For example, recent evaluations of the PARS program’s “peer
feedback” intervention were positive: There was strong buy-in by
clinical staff and the incidence of complaints declined among high-risk
physicians who received the intervention.118 There is general evidence
114. Id.
115. Gerald B. Hickson et al., A Complementary Approach to Promoting Professionalism:
Identifying, Measuring, and Addressing Unprofessional Behaviors, 82 ACAD. MED. 1040, 1046–47
(2007); Hickson et al., Development of an Early Identification and Response Model of Malprac-
tice Prevention, supra note 89; Hickson et al., Patient Complaints and Malpractice Risk, supra R
note 90. R
116. James W. Pichert et al., Advances in Patient Safety and Medical Liability, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (Aug. 2017), https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-
safety/patient-safety-resources/resources/liability/advances-in-patient-safety-medical-liability/
pichert.html.
117. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson & James W. Pichert, Identifying and Addressing Physicians
at High Risk for Medical Malpractice Claims, in BARBARA J. YOUNGBERG, PATIENT SAFETY
HANDBOOK 347 (2d ed. 2013); Karen E. Hauer et al., Remediation of the Deficiencies of Physi-
cians Across the Continuum from Medical School to Practice: A Thematic Review of the Litera-
ture, 84 ACAD. MED. 1822 (2009); Hilary Sanfey, Pursuing Professional Accountability: An
Evidence-Based Approach to Addressing Residents with Behavioral Problems, 147 ARCHIVES
SURGERY 642 (2012).
118. The PARS program evaluated in these studies involved a formal process through which a
health practitioner’s colleagues could report unsafe or disrespectful behavior and a progressive
series of responses that would be taken by hospital representatives following a report. After one
report, a “peer messenger” has a “cup of coffee conversation” in which she relays the substance
of the report, elicits the provider’s reaction, and requests that the practitioner reflect and self-
correct. After additional reports, the response is escalated to include other hospital representa-
tives, a formal corrective action plan, and potentially, disciplinary measures. Lynn E. Webb et al.,
Using Coworker Observations to Promote Accountability for Disrespectful and Unsafe Behaviors
by Physicians and Advanced Practice Professionals, 42 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY &
PATIENT SAFETY 149, 149–50 (2016). See also generally James W. Pichert et al., An Intervention
Model That Promotes Accountability: Peer Messengers and Patient/Family Complaints, 39 JOINT
COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 435 (2013).
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for the efficacy of training programs,119 but relatively little for pro-
grams targeted at frequent fliers.120
Although the evidence regarding what works to avoid recurrences
for frequent fliers is limited, movement among MLAs toward grap-
pling with IDEs, frequent fliers, and risk identification should not
wait. Advances in these areas would up the ante, propelling invest-
ment, innovation, and experimentation with prevention strategies.
CONCLUSION
The patient-safety movement launched with lofty goals and opti-
mism about prospects for making major inroads into the scourge of
medical error. It has had a sobering two decades, as the enormity of
the public health problem and the difficulty of progress have settled
in.
The movement’s relationship with law and legal institutions got off
on the wrong foot. A posture of distaste and mistrust—outright antip-
athy in the case of the liability system—was established as an early
precept, and has largely endured. We have argued that this posture
was premised on a false account of the etiology of certain medical
errors, and an over-minimization of individual accountability for those
errors—positions that have not served the movement well. We recog-
nize that these arguments are controversial, especially in patient-
safety circles. But one need not accept all (or even most) of them to
credit our core proposal: A relationship reset is in order.
MLAs, in particular, have considerable latent potential to contrib-
ute to error reduction efforts. To participate successfully in such ef-
forts, MLAs will need to step beyond traditional blinkered notions of
individual accountability, embrace greater transparency, and recog-
nize that gains should not be measured solely in terms of reductions in
malpractice costs and claim filing. Innovative MLAs are already there,
and more could be brought into the fold if a path to participation was
clearer, and if they were more fully embraced as partners in the enter-
prise. At a moment when the patient-safety movement needs allies
more than ever, it’s time to bring law in from the cold.
119. Dave Davis et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education: Do Conferences,
Workshops, Rounds, and Other Traditional Continuing Education Activities Change Physician
Behavior or Health Care Outcomes?, 282 JAMA 867 (1999).
120. Mark O’Brien et al., The Clinical Communication Program: An Effective Intervention for
Reducing Future Risk for High-Risk Physicians, 9 ASIA PAC. J. HEALTH MGMT. 8 (2014).
